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Abstract
We present a first-order and a propositional logic with unary operators that
speak about upper and lower probabilities. We describe the corresponding
class of models, and we discuss decidability issues for the propositional logic.
We provide infinitary axiomatizations for both logics and we prove that the
axiomatizations are sound and strongly complete. For some restrictions of
the logics we provide finitary axiomatic systems.1
Keywords: Probabilistic Logic, Upper and Lower Probabilities,
Axiomatization, Completeness theorem
1. Introduction
During the last few decades, uncertain reasoning has emerged as one of
the main fields in computer science and artificial intelligence. Many different
tools are developed for representing and reasoning with uncertain knowl-
edge. One particular line of research concerns the formalization in terms
of probabilistic logic. After Nilsson (1986) gave a procedure for probabilis-
tic entailment that, given probabilities of premises, calculates bounds on the
probabilities of the derived sentences, researchers from the field started inves-
tigations about formal systems for probabilistic reasoning (Fagin et al. (1990);
Fagin and Halpern (1994); Fattorosi-Barnaba and Amati (1995); Frisch and
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Haddawy (1994); Halpern (1990); Heifetz and Mongin (2001); Meier (2012);
Ognjanovic and Raskovic (1999, 2000)).
However, in many applications, sharp numerical probabilities appear too
simple for modeling uncertainty. This calls for developing different impre-
cise probability models (de Cooman and Hermans (2008); Dubois and Prade
(1988); Levi (1980); Miranda (2008); Shafer et al. (1976); Walley (1991,
2000); Zadeh (1978)). In order to model some situations of interest, some
approaches use sets of probability measures instead of one fixed measure, and
the uncertainty is represented by two boundaries – lower and upper prob-
abilities (Huber (1981); Kyburg (1961)). Consider the following example,
essentially taken from Halpern and Pucella (2002).
Example 1. Suppose that a bag contains 10 marbles and we know that 4
of them are red, and the remaining 6 are either black or green, but we do
not know the exact proportion (for example, it is possible that there are no
green marbles at all). The goal is to model a situation where the person picks
a marble from the bag at random. The cases when person picks up a red
marble (red event), when person picks up a black marble (black event) and
when person picks up a green marble (green event) will be denoted by R, B
and G, respectively. Clearly, the probability of the red event is 0.4, but we
cannot assign strict probability to black or green event. Therefore, we use
the set of probability measures P = {µα | α ∈ [0, 0.6]}, where µα assigns 0.4
probability to red event, α to black event, and 0.6 − α to green event. We
assign two functions to arbitrary set of probability measures P , first one is
P ?(X) = sup{µ(X) | µ ∈ P} and the second one is P?(X) = inf{µ(X) |
µ ∈ P} which will be used to define a range of probabilities, i.e. they will be
an upper and a lower probability, respectively.
One of the main problems in probabilistic logics with non-restricted real-
valued semantics is that those formalisms are rich enough to express the type
of a proper infinitesimal {0 < x < 1
n
| n = 1, 2, 3, . . .}, so the logics are not
compact (see Example 10). As an unpleasant logical consequence, for any
finitary axiomatic system, there are consistent sets of formulas which are
unsatisfiable (van der Hoek (1997)), i.e., the axiomatization is not strongly
complete. Halpern and Pucella (2002) provided a finitary axiomatization
for propositional reasoning about linear combinations of upper probabilities,
and they proved weak completeness (every consistent formula is satisfiable)
for the logic. Their formulas are Boolean combinations of the expressions
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of the form r1`(α1) + . . . + rn`(αn) ≥ rn+1, where ` is the upper probability
operator and ri are real numbers
2, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+ 1}.
In this paper, we propose sound and strongly complete (every consistent
set of formulas is satisfiable) propositional logic for reasoning about lower
and upper probabilities (LUPP), and its first-order extension (LUPFO3).
Our syntax is simpler than the one by Halpern and Pucella (2002), since
we don’t have the arithmetical operations built into syntax. We extend
propositional calculus (in the case of LUPP) and first-order languages (in
the case of LUPFO) with modal-like unary operators of the form U≥s and
L≥s, where s ranges over the unit interval of rational numbers. The intended
meanings of U≥sα and L≥sα are “the upper/lower probability of α is at least
s”. If Green is a propositional letter, then by the LUPP formula U=0.6Green
is a LUPP we can represent the fact that upper probability that a green
marble is picked is 0.6 (Example 1). Note that we can also represent the
strict probability of choosing a red marble (Red) in LUPP. The formula which
assigns the probability 0.4 to that event is L≥0.4Red∧U≤0.4Red. In the first-
order case, we consider formulas like L≥0.5(∀x)R(x). In natural language,
this sentence can represent the statement “the lower probability that it will
rain in all the regions of the considered country is at least a half.” (Here
the lower probability can arise from considering different weather reports,
where each report assigns fixed chance of rain to every region and also a
fixed chance for raining in all regions.) Now we introduce another example
that can be modeled in LUPFO.
Example 2. Authorities of a certain country are worried that Zika virus
may be carried into the country across the borders, and have engaged a num-
ber of health experts to estimate the probability of at least one infected person
entering the country. If the highest estimated probability is over a certain
threshold tr, the authorities will institute a restricted border crossing regime.
That constraint can be represented in our logic by the formula
U>tr(∃)Zika(x).
2Halpern and Pucella (2002) define the rich language with formulas with all the reals
as coefficients. But, in order to obtain decidability, they have to restrict their language
and allow only integer coefficients, i.e. ri ∈ Z.
3LUP stands for “lower and upper probabilities”. The suffixes P and FO indicate that
the logic is propositional or first-order, respectively.
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The corresponding semantics of our logics consist of special types of
Kripke models (possible worlds). In the propositional case, each possible
world contains an evaluation of propositional letters, while in the first-order
case it contains a first-order structure of a chosen language. In addition, each
model is equipped with a set of probability measures defined over the worlds.
In order to obtain strong completeness, we use infinitary inference rules. Thus
our languages are countable and formulas are finite, while only proofs are al-
lowed to be infinite. We also propose the restricted logics LUPP FR(n) and
LUPFOFR(n)4 (for each n in N \ {0}). For those logics, we achieve compact-
ness using only a finite set of probability values, which is still enough for many
practical applications. We propose finitary axiomatization for LUPP FR(n)
and LUPFOFR(n).
From the technical point of view, we have modified some of our earlier de-
veloped completion methods presented in Ikodinovic et al. (2014); Ilic-Stepic
et al. (2014); Ognjanovic and Raskovic (1999); Raskovic et al. (2008). Pro-
viding a compete axiom system for the logic is the key issue in formalization
of reasoning about upper and lower probabilities. In real-world situations,
we usually don’t have the complete specifications of systems, but we can
obtain probability constrains from different sources. In that way we derive
upper and lower probabilities, and the complete axiom system provides tools
to deduce formal properties of the considered system.
The contents of this paper are as follows. In Section 2 we recall the no-
tions of lower and upper probability, as well as the representation theorem
we use in our axiomatizations. In Section 3 we present the syntax and se-
mantics of the logic LUPFO, as well as the axiomatization and we prove
some auxiliary propositions. We prove the soundness and completeness of
the axiomatization in Section 4. In Section 5 we introduce the logic LUPP
and discuss its decidability. We comment the axiomatization of the logic
LUPP in Section 6, and the soundness and completeness theorem for that
logic in Section 7. In Section 8 we present the finitary logics LUPP FR(n) and
LUPFOFR(n), where the probabilities are restricted to a finite set. Section
9 is dedicated to related work and we conclude in Section 10.
4FR stands for “finite range”
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2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce some basic notions of probability theory
that we will use in the paper.
Let W 6= ∅ and let H be an algebra of subsets of W , i.e., a set of subsets
of W such that:
- W ∈ H,
- if A,B ∈ H, then W \ A ∈ H and A ∪B ∈ H.
A function µ : H −→ [0, 1] is a finitely additive probability measure, if
the following conditions hold:
- µ(W ) = 1,
- µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B), whenever A ∩B = ∅.
For a set P of probability measures defined on H, the lower probability
measure P? and the upper probability measure P
? are defined by
- P?(X) = inf{µ(X) | µ ∈ P},
- P ?(X) = sup{µ(X) | µ ∈ P}
for every X ∈ H. In the proof of soundness and completeness, we will
use the following basic properties of P? and P
?:
- P?(X) ≤ P ?(X),
- P?(X) = 1− P ?(W \X),
- P ?(X ∪ Y ) ≤ P ?(X) + P ?(Y ), whenever X ∩ Y = ∅.
Now we introduce our running example.
Example 3. A large data storage manufacturer is in the process of designing
a new storage unit. The unit is composed of a large number of hard-disk
drives, which the manufacturer can purchase from a number of brands and
models.
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For a given drive brand and model, reliability depends on a particular
production series. For each model there are statistical data from multiple
previous series on the probability of occurrence of a ”head crash” (physical
contact between the drive head and the magnetic disk) in a given time unit.
This event leads to the failure of the affected drive.
Since the storage unit itself is produced in series, each unit may contain a
different production series of the chosen drive brand and model. The manu-
facturer wants to estimate the probability of storage unit failure in the worst
case. The failure of one drive has a known probability of causing the failure
of the storage unit (a data loss event).
Let the choice (drive brand and model) A have most series with the sur-
vival probability of at least 99% (i.e. failure probability 1%), but a few series
with probability of 90% (i.e. failure probability 10%). For the choice B, the
probability is 94% to 96% for all series. Then the upper probability of drive
failure for the choice A is
P ?A(Drive failure) = sup{µ((Drive failure)) | µ ranges over all series of A}
= 10%.
Similarly, the upper probability of drive failure for the choice B is
P ?B(Drive failure) = 6%.
If the manufacturer wishes to act cautiously, i.e. to maximize the survival
probability in the worst case, they will make the choice B, due to smaller
upper probability of drive failure.
In order to axiomatize upper and lower probabilities, we need to com-
pletely characterize P? and P
? with a finite number of simple properties that
can be represented by some formulas of the logic we will introduce. Many
complete characterizations are proposed in the literature, the earliest appears
to be by Lorentz (1952). We will use the characterization by Anger and Lem-
bcke (1985) (also used by Halpern and Pucella (Halpern and Pucella, 2002,
Theorem 2.3)). We start with the definition of (n, k)-cover.
Definition 1 ((n, k)-cover). A set A is said to be covered n times by a
multiset {{A1, . . . , Am}} of sets if every element of A appears in at least n
sets from A1, . . . , Am, i.e., for all x ∈ A, there exist distinct i1, . . . , in in
{1, . . . ,m} such that for all j ≤ n, x ∈ Aij . An (n, k)-cover of (A,W ) is a
multiset {{A1, . . . , Am}} that covers W k times and covers A n+ k times.
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We illustrate this definition with the following example:
Example 4. Let A be a two element set, i.e., A = {a, a′}. By the previous
definition, A is covered 2 times by the (multi)set {{A1, A2, A3}} if at least
two out of these three sets, A1, A2, A3, contain an element a, and also at least
two out of these three sets, A1, A2, A3, contain an element a
′ as well. So, for
example, if
• A1 = {a, b, c},
• A2 = {a, a′, d},
• A3 = {a′},
then, the (multi)set {{A1, A2, A3}} covers the set A two times since a ∈
A1 ∩ A2 and a′ ∈ A2 ∩ A3.
Let W = {a, a′, b, c, d}. Then the multiset {{A1, A2, A3}} is the (1, 1)-cover
of (A,W ), since it covers A 2 times, and covers W once. Indeed, every
element of W is in at least one of the sets A1, A2, A3, because
a ∈ A1 ∩ A2
a′ ∈ A2 ∩ A3
b ∈ A1
c ∈ A1
d ∈ A2.
If, for example
• A1 = {a, b, c},
• A2 = {a, b, c},
• A3 = {a, a′},
then, the multiset {{A1, A2, A3}} is not the (1, 1)-cover of (A,W ), because it
does not cover the set A two times, since a′ ∈ A3 and a′ /∈ A1∪A2 (note that
also {{A1, A2, A3}} does not cover W once).
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Theorem 1 (Anger and Lembcke (1985)). Let W be a set, H an alge-
bra of subsets of W , and f a function f : H −→ [0, 1]. There exists a set
P of probability measures such that f = P ? iff f satisfies the following three
properties:
(1) f(∅) = 0,
(2) f(W ) = 1,
(3) for all natural numbers m,n, k and all subsets A1, . . . , Am in H, if
{{A1, . . . , Am}} is an (n, k)-cover of (A,W ), then k+nf(A) ≤
∑m
i=1 f(Ai).
Those three properties are crucial for obtaining the complete axiomatiza-
tion. The third property is completely described by the axioms (7) and (8)
in Section 3.3 (see the explanation after the axiomatization). The first two
properties do not have corresponding axioms, but those two simple properties
can be derived in the system (Lemma 1 (a) and (b)).
3. The Logic LUPFO
In this section we discuss the syntax and semantics of the logic LUPFO.
First-order logic is widely recognized as being a fundamental building block
in knowledge representation. As usual, if we are interested in a subjective
approach to probabilistic first-order reasoning, then we can take the set of
possible worlds to be first-order structures.
Let S = Q ∩ [0, 1] and V ar = {x, y, z, . . .} be a denumerable set of
variables. Language for the logic LUPFO consists of:
• the elements of the set V ar,
• classical propositional connectives ¬ and ∧5,
• universal quantifier ∀,
• for every integer k ≥ 0, denumerably many function symbols F k0 , F k1 , . . .
of arity k,
• for every integer k ≥ 0, denumerably many relation symbols P k0 , P k1 , . . .
of arity k,
5Other connectives, ∨, →, ↔, are defined in the standard way
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• the list of upper probability operators U≥s, for every s ∈ S,
• the list of lower probability operators L≥s, for every s ∈ S,
• comma, parentheses.
The function symbols of arity 0 are called constant symbols.
3.1. Formulas
The set of terms is inductively defined as follows:
a) any variable is a term,
b) if t1, . . . tn are terms and F a function symbol, then F (t1, . . . , tn) is a
term as well.
Only expressions which can be obtained by finitely many applications of rules
a) and b) are terms.
Classical first-order formulas are defined as usual. We will denote them by
α, β, . . ., and the set of all classical first-order formulas will be denoted by
ForFO. Existential quantifier, ∃x, is defined as (∃x)α := ¬(∀x)¬α. The
variable in a formula is free iff it is not quantified.
Example 5. Continuing Example 3, we introduce the first-order language
whose variables represent possible choices of drive brand and model, and the
unary relation symbols Head Crash, Drive Death and Data Loss which rep-
resent the head crash, drive failure and storage unit failure (respectively) of a
choice (within a given time unit). Then, the fact that the head crash of any
drive, certainly leads to the failure of the affected drive, can be represented
by the formula
(∀x)(Head Crash(x)→ Drive Death(x)).
Now we introduce the basic formulas that speak about lower and upper
probabilities.
Definition 2. (Basic lower and upper probabilistic formulas) If α ∈
ForFO and s ∈ S, then a basic first-order lower probability formula is any
formula of the form L≥sα, and a basic first-order upper probability formula
is any formula of the form U≥sα.
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Example 6. Following Example 3, let c be the constant symbol that represent
the choice C. Then the basic upper probability formula
U≥0.05Head Crash(c)
says that the upper probability of head crash for the choice C is at least 0, 05
(i.e., there is a series of the corresponding model with the probability of head
crash at least 0, 05).
Now suppose that Last Longer(x, y) is a relation that tells that the ex-
pected life time of choice x is greater than expected life time of choice y.
Then the formula
U≥0.5(∃x)(Last Longer(x, c))
states that the upper probability that there is a choice which lasts longer than
C is at least a half.
Definition 3 (first-order lower and upper probabilistic formulas). The
set of all first-order lower and upper probabilistic formulas, denoted by ForFOP ,
is the smallest set containing all basic first-order lower and upper probability
formulas which is closed under Boolean connectives. We will denote formulas
from ForFOP by φ, ψ, . . ., possibly indexed.
We use the following abbreviations to introduce other types of inequal-
ities: U<sα is ¬U≥sα, L<sα is ¬L≥sα, U≤sα is L≥1−s¬α, L≤sα is U≥1−s¬α,
U=sα is U≤sα∧U≥sα, L=sα is L≤sα∧L≥sα, U>sα is ¬U≤sα, L>sα is ¬L≤sα.
We also denote both α ∧ ¬α and φ ∧ ¬φ by ⊥ (and similarly for >).
Example 7. Continuing Example 3, the formula
U≥0.05Drive Death(x))→ L≤0.99¬Data Loss(x)).
says that if upper probability of drive failure of the choice x within given time
unit is at least 0.05, then the lower probability that its data loss will not occur
within the time unit is at most 0.99.
Definition 4 (LUPFO formulas). The set of all LUPFO formulas is the
set
For = ForFO ∪ ForFOP .
LUPFO formulas will be denoted by ρ, σ, . . ., possibly with subscripts.
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Note that formulas are defined in the same style as in the works of Cintula
and Noguera (2014); Ha´jek et al. (1995); Ognjanovic and Raskovic (2000),
i.e. neither mixing of pure propositional formulas and lower and upper prob-
abilistic formulas, nor iteration of lower and upper probability operators are
allowed.
In the logic LUPFO, a sentence is either a classical first-order sentence
(a formula with no free variables), or a lower and upper probabilistic formula
in which all the operators are applied to classical sentences.
Example 8.
(∃x)P 20 (x, F 00 ) ∧ P 11 (F 11 (x)) and L≥ 1
2
(∀x)P 30 (F 10 (x), x, F 01 ),
are first-order lower and upper probabilistic formulas, but
α ∨ U< 1
3
(∃x)P 10 (x) and L= 1
4
U<1β,
are not first-order lower and upper probabilistic formulas.
3.2. Semantics
Definition 5. A LUPFO-model is a tuple M = 〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉, where:
• W is a non-empty set of objects, i.e., set of (possible) worlds,
• D associates with each world w in W a non-empty set D(w) as a do-
main,
• I associates an interpretation of function and relation symbols with
every w ∈ W : I(w)(F nj ) : D(w)n → D(w) and I(w)(Rmi ) ⊆ D(w)m,
• υ associates a valuation of variables υ(w) with each world w ∈ W , i.e.
υ(w) : V ar → D(w),
• H is an algebra of subsets of W ,
• P is a set of finitely additive measures on H.
It is not hard to see that every world w with its associated domain,
variable valuation and interpretation is one classical first-order model. For a
given α ∈ ForFO, we will use the notation [α] = {w ∈ W |
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〈D(w), I(w), υ(w)〉 |=FO α}6. The class of all LUPFO-models M with the
property that for every α ∈ ForFO, [α] ∈ H, we will denote by LUPFOMeas.
Elements from LUPFOMeas will be called measurable LUPFO-models.
Definition 6 (Satisfiability relation). The satisfiability relation,
|=⊆ LUPFOMeas × For, is defined in the way such that for
M = 〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉 we have:
• if α ∈ ForFO, M |= α iff 〈D(w), I(w), υ(w)〉 |=FO α, for every w ∈ W ,
• if α ∈ ForFO, M |= U≥sα iff P ?([α]) ≥ s,
• if α ∈ ForFO, M |= L≥sα iff P?([α]) ≥ s,
• M |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that M |= φ,
• M |= φ ∧ ψ iff M |= φ and M |= ψ,
where φ, ψ ∈ ForFO.
Example 9. Suppose that the first-order language contains only one relation
symbol, the unary symbol Head Crash. Let M = 〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉 be a model
such that:
• W = {w1, w2, w3}.
• D(w1) = D(w2) = D(w3) = D, where D is a set of choices which
contains the choices A and B.
• I associates the interpretation HC to the relation symbol Head Crash
in the following way: HC(w1) = {A}, HC(w2) = {B} and HC(w3) = ∅.
• υ is any mapping which associates a valuation of variables with each
world w ∈ W , such that υ(w1)(x) = B, υ(w2)(x) = A and υ(w3)(x) =
B.
• H is the algebra of all subsets of W ,
• P = {µ1, µ2}, where µ1 and µ2 are the unique probability measures
defined by:
6|=FO stands for the first-order satisfiability relation
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– µ1(w1) = 0.5, µ1(w2) = 0.3, µ1(w3) = 0.2,
– µ2(w1) = 0.2, µ2(w2) = 0.4, µ2(w3) = 0.4.
Let us consider satisfiability of the formulas
φ = U>0Head Crash(x),
ψ1 = L≥0.7(∃x)Head Crash(x) and
ψ2 = U≥0.7(∃x)Head Crash(x)
in the model M . Note that 〈D(w1), I(w1), υ(w1)〉 6|=FO Head Crash(x), since
υ(w1)(x) = B and B /∈ HC(w1). Similarly, 〈D(w2), I(w2), υ(w2〉 6|=FO
Head Crash(x) and 〈D(w3), I(w3), υ(w3)〉 6|=FO Head Crash(x). Consequently,
[Head Crash(x)] = ∅, so µ1([Head Crash(x)]) = µ2([Head Crash(x)]) = 0.
Then P ?([Head Crash(x)]) = sup{µ1([Head Crash(x)]), µ2([Head Crash(x)])}
= 0, so we conclude that
M 6|= U>0Head Crash(x).
Note that 〈D(w1), I(w1), υ(w1)〉 |=FO (∃x)Head Crash(x) since HC(w1) =
{A}, 〈D(w2), I(w2), υ(w2〉 |=FO (∃x)Head Crash(x) since HC(w2) = {B}
and 〈D(w3), I(w3), υ(w3)〉 6|=FO (∃x)Head Crash(x) since HC(w3) = ∅. Con-
sequently, [(∃x)Head Crash(x)] = {w1, w2}, so µ1([(∃x)Head Crash(x)]) =
0.5 + 0.3 = 0.8 and µ2([(∃x)Head Crash(x)]) = 0.2 + 0.4 = 0.6. Then
P?([(∃x)Head Crash(x)]) = inf{0.8, 0.6} = 0.6 and P ?([(∃x)Head Crash(x)])
= 0.8. Finally, we conclude
M 6|= L≥0.7(∃x)Head Crash(x)
and
M |= U≥0.7(∃x)Head Crash(x).
Definition 7 (Satisfiability of a formula). A formula ρ ∈ For is satis-
fiable if there is a measurable LUPFO-model M such that M |= ρ; ρ is valid
if for every measurable LUPFO-model M , M |= ρ. A set of formulas T is
satisfiable if there is a measurable LUPFO-model M such that M |= ρ for
every ρ ∈ T .
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Example 10. Consider the set
T = {¬U=0α} ∪ {U< 1
n
α | n is a positive integer}.
Every finite subset of T is satisfiable, but the set T itself is not. Therefore,
the compactness theorem, which states that ”if every finite subset of T is
satisfiable, then T is satisfiable”, does not hold for LUPFO.
3.3. The Axiomatization AxLUPFO
Now we are ready to introduce the axiomatic system for the logic LUPFO,
which we denote by AxLUPFO. In order to axiomatize upper and lower proba-
bilities, we need to completely characterize P? and P
? with a finite number of
properties. Many complete characterizations are proposed in the literature,
the earliest appears to be by Lorentz (1952). We will use the characteriza-
tion by Anger and Lembcke (1985) (also used in (Halpern and Pucella, 2002,
Theorem 2.3)).
Axiom schemes
(1) all axioms of the classical propositional logic, separately for formulas
from ForFO and for formulas from ForFOP ,
(2) (∀x)(α→ β)→ (α→ (∀x)β), where the variable x does not occur free
in α and α, β ∈ ForFO,
(3) (∀x)α(x) → α(t), where α(t) is obtained by substitution of all free
occurrences of x in the first-order formula α(x) by the term t which is
free for x in α(x),
(4) U≤1α ∧ L≤1α
(5) U≤rα→ U<sα, s > r
(6) U<sα→ U≤sα
(7) (U≤r1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤rmαm) → U≤rα, if α →
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k+n
∧
j∈J αj
and
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J αj are propositional tautologies, where r =∑m
i=1 ri−k
n
, n 6= 0
(8) ¬(U≤r1α1 ∧ . . .∧U≤rmαm), if
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J αj is a propositional
tautology and
∑m
i=1 ri < k
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(9) L=1(α→ β)→ (U≥sα→ U≥sβ)
Inference Rules
Let α ∈ ForFO and ρ, σ ∈ For.
(1) From ρ and ρ→ σ infer σ
(2) From α infer (∀x)α
(3) From α infer L≥1α
(4) From the set of premises
{φ→ U≥s− 1
k
α | k ∈ N, k ≥ 1
s
}
infer φ→ U≥sα
(5) From the set of premises
{φ→ L≥s− 1
k
α | k ∈ N, k ≥ 1
s
}
infer φ→ L≥sα.
By the axioms (1)− (3), we have that classical first-order logic is sublogic
of the LUPFO.
Axiom 4 states that the upper bound for upper and lower probabilities is
1. Axioms 5 and 6 state properties of the order of reals; without them even
the obvious statements like U≤ 1
2
α→ U≤ 3
4
α would not be formally derivable.
They are equivalent to Lemma 1 (c) and (d), and they are explicitly used in
the proof of Strong Completeness Theorem 5. Axioms 7 and 8 are the logical
analogue of the third condition from Theorem 1. Indeed, we can formally
write that {{A1, . . . , Am}} covers a set A n times as
A ⊆
⋃
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=n
⋂
j∈J
Aj.
Therefore, the condition that the formula α→ ∨J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k+n∧j∈J αj is a
tautology gives us that [α] is covered n+k times by a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}},
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while the condition that
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J αj is a propositional tautology
ensures that W = [>] is covered k times by a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}}.
Axiom 9 is crucial for proving that equivalent formulas have equal lower and
upper probabilities (see Lemma 1(e)).
Rule 1 is modus ponens, Rule 3 is the lower probability necessitation.
Both Rule 4 and Rule 5 are infinitary rules of inference and Rule 4 intuitively
says that if upper probability is arbitrary close to s then it is at least s,
while Rule 5 intuitively says that if lower probability is arbitrary close to
s then it is at least s. They have the role to ensure that some infinitary
sets are inconsistent. That is the reason that those two rules are infinite - all
formulas from an infinite set should be taken as premises in the corresponding
application of a rule. In particular, they are used in the proof of Lemma 2 (b)
and (c). This lemma is crucial for proving Lindenbaum Lemma (Theorem
4.2). Finally, the rules 4 and 5 are given in the implicative form to allow a
straightforward proof of Deduction theorem.
Definition 8 (Inference relation).
- T ` ρ (ρ is derivable from T) if there is an at most denumerable se-
quence of formulas ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρ, such that every ρi is an axiom or a
formula from the set T , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by
an inference rule;
- ` ρ (ρ is a theorem) iff ∅ ` ρ;
- T is consistent if there is at least a formula α ∈ ForFO and a formula
φ ∈ ForFOP that are not deducible from T , otherwise T is inconsistent;
- T is maximally consistent set if it is consistent and:
(1) for every α ∈ ForFO, if T ` α, then α ∈ T and L≥1α ∈ T
(2) for every φ ∈ ForFOP , either φ ∈ T or ¬φ ∈ T .
- T is deductively closed if for every ρ ∈ For, if T ` ρ, then ρ ∈ T .
It is easy to check that T is inconsistent iff T ` ⊥. Note that it is not
required that for every α ∈ ForFO, either α or ¬α belongs to a maximal
consistent set (as it is done for formulas from ForFOP ). Otherwise, it can
be proved that in our canonical model, by Rule 3, for each α we would have
L≥1α or L≥1¬α so the lower (and the upper) probability operator would not
make sense.
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Example 11. Now we will use our running Example 3 to illustrate the in-
ference in the introduced axiom system. Suppose that the failure of one drive
has a known probability of causing the failure of the storage unit (a data loss
event), given by the function f : for the probability p of the drive failure, the
probability of the failure of the storage unit is f(p). Suppose also that the
statistics showed that for the choice C there are series with the probability
of head crash, within a given time unit, at least 0.05. Recall that head crash
always leads to disk failure. It is easy to conclude that the upper probability
of the data loss for the choice C is at least f(0.05). Now we show that this
conclusion can be formally derived in the logic LUPFO.
Let T be a set of formulas which contains all the information above. Then,
in particular, it contains the following formulas:
(∀x)(Head Crash(x)→ Drive Death(x)) (1)
(“Head crash certainly leads to the disk failure”),
U≥0.05Head Crash(c) (2)
(“Upper probability of head crash for the choice C (whose corresponding con-
stant symbol is c) is at least 0.05”), and the set of formulas
{U≥sDrive Death(c)→ U≥f(s)Data Loss(c) | s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]}. (3)
From the formula (1) and Axiom 3 we have
T ` Head Crash(c)→ Drive Death(c). (4)
If we apply Rule 3 to (4), we obtain
T ` L=1(Head Crash(c)→ Drive Death(c)). (5)
From Axiom 9 we obtain
` L=1(Head Crash(c)→ Drive Death(c))→ (6)
(U≥0.05Head Crash(c)→ U≥0.05Drive Death(c)). (7)
From (5) and (6), using Modus Ponens, we derive
T ` U≥0.05Head Crash(c)→ U≥0.05Drive Death(c). (8)
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Now, by applying Modus Ponens to (2) and (8) we conclude
T ` U≥0.05Drive Death(c). (9)
Finally, from (3) and (9) we obtain
T ` U≥f(0.05)Data Loss(c). (10)
Theorem 2 (Deduction theorem). Let T be a set of sentences. Then
T∪{ρ} ` σ iff T ` ρ→ σ, where either both ρ, σ ∈ ForFO, or ρ, σ ∈ ForFOP .
Proof. The only interesting case is when ρ,σ ∈ ForFOP .
(⇐) Direct consequence of Rule 1.
(⇒) Suppose that T ∪ {ρ} ` σ. We will use the induction on the length of
the inference.
The cases when either ` σ or ρ = σ or σ is obtained by application of
Modus Ponens are the same as in the classical propositional case. Thus, let
us consider the case where σ = (∀x)σ1 is obtained by an application of Rule
2 from T, ρ ` σ1. In that case we have:
T ` ρ→ σ1,by the induction hypothesis
T ` (∀x)(ρ→ σ1), by Rule 2
T ` (∀x)(ρ→ σ1)→ (ρ→ (∀x)σ1), Axiom 2
T ` ρ→ σ, by Rule 1
Now, let σ = L≥1α be obtained from T ∪ {ρ} by an application of Rule
3. In that case:
- T, ρ ` α
- T, ρ ` L≥1α by Rule 3
However, since α ∈ ForFO and ρ ∈ ForFOP , ρ cannot affect the proof of α
from T ∪ {ρ}, and we have:
(1) T ` α
(2) T ` L≥1α by Rule 3
(3) T ` L≥1α→ (ρ→ L≥1α)
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(4) T ` ρ→ L≥1α by Rule 1.
Next, let us consider the case where σ = σ1 → U≥sα is obtained from T ∪{ρ}
by an application of Rule 4. Then:
(1) T, ρ ` σ1 → U≥s− 1
k
α, for all k ≥ 1
s
(2) T ` ρ→ (σ1 → U≥s− 1
k
α), by the induction hypothesis
(3) T ` (ρ ∧ σ1)→ U≥s− 1
k
α
(4) T ` (ρ ∧ σ1)→ U≥sα, by Rule 4
(5) T ` ρ→ σ.
If the formula is obtained by an application of Rule 5, the proof is similar.

We will not always explicitly emphasize moments in proofs where we use
Deduction theorem.
Proposition 1. ` U≤rα→ L≤rα.
Proof. We consider two cases.
(1) r 6= 1. From Axiom (8) we obtain that ¬(U≤rα ∧ U≤s¬α), whenever
r + s < 1. Therefore U≤rα → U>s¬α, and because that holds for
every s < 1 − r, by inference rule (4) we have U≤rα → U≥1−r¬α, i.e.
U≤rα→ L≤rα.
(2) r = 1. Direct consequence of Axiom (4). 
Consequently, we obtain that
` L≥rα→ U≥rα
for each r ∈ S.
Lemma 1.
(a) ` U=1>
(b) ` U=0⊥
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(c) ` U≥sα→ U>rα, s > r
(d) ` U>sα→ U≥sα
(e) If T ` α↔ β then T ` U≥sα↔ U≥sβ
Proof.
The proofs of (a) and (b) are straightforward, (c) and (d) are obtained from
Axioms (5) and (6) and contraposition, and (e) is direct consequence of Rule
(3) and Axiom (9). 
4. Soundness and Completeness
4.1. Soundness
Theorem 3 (Soundness). The axiomatic system AxLUPFO is sound with
respect to the class of measurable LUPFO-models.
Proof. Our goal is to show that every instance of an axiom schemata
holds in every model and that the inference rules preserve the validity. The
soundness theorem for the first-order logic implies that every instance of an
axioms (1) − (3) hold in every model, and that inference rule (2) preserve
validity.
Now, for example, let us consider Axiom (7). Suppose that
α→
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k+n
∧
j∈J
αj
and ∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J
αj
are propositional tautologies, and suppose that
(U≤r1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤rmαm)
holds in a model M = 〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉. We already explained that this
means that a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}} is an (n, k)-cover of ([α], [>]). Also,
the inequalities P ?([α1]) ≤ r1,. . . ,P ?([αm]) ≤ rm hold, by assumption. Since
P ? is an upper probability measure, by Theorem 1, we know that
k + nP ?([α]) ≤
m∑
i=1
P ?([αi]),
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so we obtain that
P ?([α]) ≤
∑m
i=1 ri − k
n
, n 6= 0
therefore
P ?([α]) ≤ r, r =
∑m
i=1 ri − k
n
,
i.e. M |= U≤rα as well.
For Axiom (8), suppose that ∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J
αj
is a propositional tautology, i.e., a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}} covers W k-
times, and that
∑m
i=1 ri < k. The goal is to show that
¬(U≤r1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤rmαm)
holds in a model M . Suppose that it is not the case, i.e.,
M |= U≤r1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤rmαm.
Then, we have that P ?([α1]) ≤ r1, . . . ,P ?([αm]) ≤ rm, hence
m∑
i=1
P ?([αi]) ≤
m∑
i=1
ri < k.
By Theorem 1, we have that
m∑
i=1
P ?([αi]) ≥ k.
Contradiction, so M |= ¬(U≤r1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤rmαm).
Consider now the Axiom (9). If M |= L=1(α→ β), we have that
P?([α→ β]) = 1,
so
P ?([α ∧ ¬β]) = 1− P?([α→ β]) = 0.
Therefore
P ?([α]) = P ?([α ∧ β] ∪ [α ∧ ¬β]) ≤ P ?([α ∧ β]) + P ?([α ∧ ¬β]) ≤ P ?([β]).
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Hence, if P ?([α]) ≥ s, then P ?([β]) ≥ s, so M |= U≥sα → U≥sβ. The other
axioms can be proved to be valid in a similar way.
Rule (1) is validity-preserving for the same reason as in classical logic.
Rule (2) is similar to the classical case. Rule (3): if α holds in M =
〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉, then [α] = W , and therefore µ([α]) = 1 for every µ ∈ P .
Then P?([α]) = 1, so M |= L≥1α. Rule (4): Suppose that M |= φ→ U≥s− 1
k
α
whenever k ≥ 1
s
. If M 6|= φ, then obviously M |= φ → U≥sα. Otherwise
M |= U≥s− 1
k
α for every k ≥ 1
s
, so M |= U≥sα because of the properties of the
set of reals. Rule (5) is validity-preserving for the same reason as Rule (4).

4.2. Completeness
In order to prove the completeness theorem we start with some auxiliary
statements. After that, we show how to extend a consistent set of formulas
T to a maximal consistent set of formulas T ?. Finally, we construct the
canonical model using the set T ? such that MT ? |= ρ iff ρ ∈ T ?.
Lemma 2. Let T ⊆ For be a consistent set.
(1) For any formula φ ∈ ForFOP , either T ∪{φ} is consistent or T ∪{¬φ}
is consistent.
(2) If ¬(φ → U≥sα) ∈ T , then there is some n > 1s such that T ∪ {φ →¬U≥s− 1
n
α} is consistent.
(3) If ¬(φ → L≥sα) ∈ T , then there is some n > 1s such that T ∪ {φ →¬L≥s− 1
n
α} is consistent.
Proof.
(1) If T ∪ {φ} ` ⊥, and T ∪ {¬φ} ` ⊥, then by Deduction theorem we
have T ` ¬φ and T ` φ. Contradiction.
(2) Suppose that for all n > 1
s
:
T, φ→ ¬U≥s− 1
n
α ` ⊥.
Therefore, by Deduction theorem and propositional reasoning, we have
T ` φ→ U≥s− 1
n
α,
and by application of Rule 4 we obtain T ` φ→ U≥sα. Contradiction
with the fact that ¬(φ→ U≥sα) ∈ T .
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(3) can be proved in a similar way. 
Now we prove the Lindenbaum lemma for the logic LUPFO.
Theorem 4. Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a maximal
consistent set.
Proof. Consider a consistent set T . By CnFO(T ) we will denote the set
of all first-order formulas that are consequences of T . Let φ0, φ1, . . . be an
enumeration of all formulas from ForFOP . We define a sequence of sets Ti,
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . as follows:
(1) T0 = T ∪ CnFO(T ) ∪ {L≥1α | α ∈ CnFO(T )}
(2) for every i ≥ 0,
(a) if Ti ∪ {φi} is consistent, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {φi}, otherwise
(b) if φi is of the form ψ → U≥sβ, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬φi, ψ →
¬U≥s− 1
n
β}, for some positive integer n, so that Ti+1 is consistent,
otherwise
(c) if φi is of the form ψ → L≥sβ, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬φi, ψ →
¬L≥s− 1
n
β}, for some positive integer n, so that Ti+1 is consistent,
otherwise
(d) Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬φi}.
(3) T ? =
⋃∞
i=0 Ti.
The set T0 is obviously consistent because it contains consequences of an
consistent set. Note that existence of the natural numbers (n) from the steps
2(b) and 2(c) of the construction is provided by Lemma 2, and each Ti is
consistent.
It still remains to show that T ? is maximal consistent set. The steps (1)
and (2) of the above construction ensure that T ? is maximal.
T ? obviously doesn’t contain all formulas. If α ∈ ForFO, by the construc-
tion of T0, α and ¬α can not be both in T0. For a formula φ ∈ ForFOP , the
set T ? does not contain both φ = φi and ¬φ = φj, because the set Tmax{i,j}+1
is consistent.
Let us prove that T ? is deductively closed. If a formula α ∈ ForFO
and T ` α, then by the construction of T0, α ∈ T ? and L≥1α ∈ T ?. Let
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φ ∈ ForFOP . It can be easily proved (induction on the length of the inference)
that if T ? ` φ, then φ ∈ T ?. Note the fact that, if φ = φj and Ti ` φ it has
to be φ ∈ T ? because Tmax{i,j}+1 is consistent.
Suppose that the sequence φ1, φ2, . . . , φ is the proof of φ from T
?. If the
mentioned sequence is finite, there must be some set Ti such that Ti ` φ,
and φ ∈ T ?. Therefore, suppose that the sequence is countably infinite. We
can show that, for every i, if φi is obtained by an application of an arbitrary
inference rule, and all the premises belong to T ?, then, also φi ∈ T ?. If the
inference rule is finitary one, then there must be a set Tj which contains all
the premises and Tj ` φi. So, we conclude that φi ∈ T ?.
Now, consider the infinitary Rule 4. Let φi = ψ → U≥sα be obtained from
the set of premises {φki = ψ → U≥skα | sk = s − 1k , k > 1s , k ∈ N}. By the
induction hypothesis, we have that φki ∈ T ?, for every k. If φi /∈ T ?, by step
(2)(b) of the construction, there are some l and j so that
¬(ψ → U≥sα), ψ → ¬U≥s− 1
l
α ∈ Tj.
Thus, we have that for some j′ ≥ j:
- ψ ∧ ¬U≥sα ∈ Tj′ ,
- ψ ∈ Tj′ ,
- ¬U≥s− 1
l
α, U≥s− 1
l
α ∈ Tj′ .
Contradiction with the consistency of a set Tj′ .
If we consider the infinitary Rule 5, the proof is similar.
Thus, T ? is deductively closed set which does not contain all formulas, so
it is consistent. 
Now we use T ? to define a measurable structure MT ? . The main idea is
that maximality of T ? ensures that for every formula α and every rational
number from the unit interval s, the set T ? contains one of the following
formulas: U>α, U<α or U=α. Then we can use the density of rational num-
bers in the set of reals to define P ?. Then the axioms 7 and 8 and Lemma 1
(a) and (b) will guarantee that all the three conditions from Theorem 1 are
fulfilled, which provide us with a set of probability measures for the structure
MT ? .
Let D be a countably infinite set. We associate each object w(υ¯,I¯) with a
pair (υ¯, I¯), where υ¯ is a valuation on D and I¯ is an interpretation of relation
and function symbols.
Definition 9. If T ? is the maximally consistent set of formulas, then a
canonical model MT ? = 〈W,D, I, υ,H, P 〉 is defined as follows:
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• W = {w(υ¯,I¯) | w(υ¯,I¯) |= CnFO(T )} contains all first-order interpreta-
tions that satisfy the set CnFO(T ),
• I(w(υ¯,I¯)) = I¯ and υ(w(υ¯,I¯)) = υ¯, for w(υ¯,I¯) ∈ W ,
• H = {[α] | α ∈ ForFO}, where [α] = {w(υ¯,I¯) ∈ W | w(υ¯,I¯) |= α},
• P is any set of probability measures such that P ?([α]) = sup{s | U≥sα ∈
T ?}.
Note that as a consequence of the fact that those two boundaries don’t
capture all the information contained in the set of probabilities, MT ? is not
unique for a given T ?., i.e., there might be more different sets of probability
measures whose upper and lower probability are P ? and P?.
Lemma 3. Let T ? be a maximal consistent set of formulas. Then, MT ? ∈
LUPFOMeas.
Proof. First, we prove that MT ? is well defined.
The proof that H is an algebra is straightforward.
P ?([α]) := sup{s | U≥sα ∈ T ?} is well defined because [α] = [β] implies
sup{s | U≥sα ∈ T ?} = sup{s | U≥sβ ∈ T ?}, by Lemma 1(e). Let f([α]) =
sup{s | U≥sα ∈ T ?}. We want to prove that f is an upper probability
measure for some set of probability measures P , i.e., there exists P such that
f = P ?. It is sufficient to prove the three conditions from Theorem 1. Using
Lemma 1 (a), (b), the conditions f(∅) = 0 and f(W ) = 1 become trivial to
prove. The only thing left to prove is that if {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}} is (n, k)-cover
of ([α],W ), then k + nf([α]) ≤∑mi=1 f([αi]).
Let f([αi]) = ai, i.e. sup{r | U≥rαi ∈ T ?} = ai, i = 1, . . . ,m. For
arbitrary ε > 0 there exists rational numbers qi ∈ [ai, ai + ε] such that
U≤qiαi ∈ T ? (otherwise U>qiαi ∈ T ? which is contradiction with the fact that
ai is supremum). Hence, we have
T ? ` U≤q1α1 ∧ . . . ∧ U≤qmαm,
and by Axiom 7, we have
T ? ` U≤qα, q =
∑m
i=1 qi − k
n
, n 6= 0,
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i.e.,
sup{r | U≥rα ∈ T ?} ≤ q
or
f([α]) ≤ q.
Therefore, we have
f([α]) ≤
∑m
i=1 qi − k
n
≤
∑m
i=1 ai +mε− k
n
, qi ≤ ai + ε,
and because this holds for every ε > 0 we obtain k+nf([α]) ≤∑mi=1 f([αi]).
If n = 0, we need to show that k ≤∑mi=1 f([αi]). Reasoning as above, we
have that T ? ` U≤q1α1 ∧ . . .∧U≤qmαm, for some qi ∈ [ai, ai + ε], and because
of Axiom (8), and
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J |=k
∧
j∈J αj are propositional tautologies, we
have that
∑m
i=1 qi ≥ k. Since that holds for every ε > 0, we obtain
∑m
i=1 ai ≥
k.
Directly from the construction of MT ? we have that MT ? ∈ LUPFOMeas. 
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 5 (Strong completeness). A set of formulas T is consistent iff
it is satisfiable.
Proof. Direction from right to left follows from the Soundness Theorem.
For the proof of the other direction we extend a consistent set to a maximal
consistent set using Theorem 4 and then we construct LUPFOMeas-model
MT ? as in Definition 9 (Lemma 3 guarantee that it is a measurable LUPFO-
model), and show that for every ρ ∈ For, MT ? |= ρ iff ρ ∈ T ?. We use the
induction on the complexity of the formula.
- ρ = α ∈ ForFO. If α ∈ CnFO(T ), then by definition of MT ? we have
MT ? |= α. Conversely, if MT ? |= α, by the completeness of classical
first-order logic we have that α ∈ CnFO(T ).
- Consider the case when ρ = U≥sα. If U≥sα ∈ T ?, then
sup{r | U≥rα ∈ T ?} = P ?([α]) ≥ s,
and so MT ? |= U≥sα. Now, suppose that MT ? |= U≥sα, i.e.
sup{r | U≥rα ∈ T ?} ≥ s.
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a) If P ?([α]) > s, then by the properties of supremum and mono-
tonicity of P ? (Lemma 1 (c), (d)), we have U≥sα ∈ T ?.
b) If P ?([α]) = s, then, as a direct consequence of inference Rule 4,
we have that U≥sα ∈ T ?.
- Next, let ρ = L≥sα, i.e. ρ = U≤1−s¬α. First, suppose that U≤1−s¬α ∈
T ?. We want to show that
sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} ≤ 1− s,
so suppose that
sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} > 1− s.
Then, there exist a rational number q ∈ (1 − s, 1 − s + ], for some
 > 0, such that
U≥q¬α ∈ T ?.
Hence, U>1−s¬α ∈ T ? which leads us to contradiction. So,
sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} ≤ 1− s,
i.e.
P ?([¬α]) ≤ 1− s
and thus we obtain MT ? |= L≥sα. Now, for the other direction, suppose
that MT ? |= U≤1−s¬α, i.e. sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} ≤ 1− s. Consider the
following two cases:
(1) sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} < 1 − s. Then, if U>1−s¬α ∈ T ?, then also
U≥1−s¬α ∈ T ?, so sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} ≥ 1− s. Contradiction.
(2) sup{r | U≥r¬α ∈ T ?} = 1− s. We want to show that then
inf{r | U≤r¬α ∈ T ?} = 1− s
must hold as well. First, suppose that
inf{r | U≤r¬α ∈ T ?} < 1− s.
Hence, there exist a rational number q1 ∈ [1 − s − , 1 − s) such
that
U≤q1¬α ∈ T ?,
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and so U<1−s¬α ∈ T ?, contradiction with the fact that U≥1−s¬α ∈
T ? (direct consequence of inference rule (4)). Now, suppose that
inf{r | U≤r¬α ∈ T ?} > 1− s,
i.e.
inf{r | U≤r¬α ∈ T ?} = 1− s+ ε.
Take an arbitrary rational number q2 ∈ (1− s, 1− s+ ε) and then
both U≤q2¬α ∈ T ? and U≥q2¬α ∈ T ? leads us to contradiction
(because of the properties of infimum and supremum), which is
impossible. Therefore,
inf{r | U≤r¬α ∈ T ?} = 1− s,
or equvivalently
inf{r | L≥1−rα ∈ T ?} = 1− s
and then, by the inference Rule 5, we obtain that L≥sα ∈ T ?.
- Now, let ρ = ¬ψ ∈ ForFOP . Then MT ? |= ¬ψ iff it is not the case that
MT ? |= ψ iff ψ /∈ T ? iff ¬ψ ∈ T ?.
- Finally, let ρ = φ ∧ ψ ∈ ForFOP . Then, MT ? |= φ ∧ ψ iff MT ? |= φ and
MT ? |= ψ iff φ, ψ ∈ T ? iff φ ∧ ψ ∈ T ?. 
5. The logic LUPP
In this section we will describe the syntax and semantics of the logic
LUPP , and we discuss the decidability problem of satisfiability of LUPP -
formulas.
5.1. Syntax
Let S be the set of rational numbers from [0, 1] and let L = {p, q, r, . . .}
be a countable set of propositional letters. The language of logic LUPP
consists of the elements of set L, classical propositional connectives ¬ and ∧
and the lists of upper probability operators U≥s and L≥s, for every s ∈ S.
The set of all classical propositional formulas over L is defined as usual, and
we will denote it by ForC
7. We will denote the propositional formulas by α,
β and γ.
7C stands for classical
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Definition 10. (Lower and upper probabilistic formulas) If α ∈ ForC
and s ∈ S, then a basic lower probability formula is any formula of the form
L≥sα, and a basic upper probability formula is any formula of the form U≥sα.
The set of all lower and upper probabilistic formulas, denoted by ForP , is the
smallest set containing all basic lower and upper probability formulas which
is closed under Boolean connectives.
We denote the lower and upper probabilistic formulas by φ and ψ, possibly
indexed. Let
ForLUPP = ForC ∪ ForP .
The formulas from the set ForLUPP will be denoted by ρ and σ, possibly
with subscripts.
We use the same abbreviations for L<sα, L≤sα, L=sα, L>sα, U<sα, U≤sα,
U=sα and U>sα as for the formulas from ForLUPFO.
Example 12. Continuing Example 1, it is clear that upper and lower prob-
ability, for the case that picked marble is green or black, are equal to 0.6. If
there are no green marbles at all, then we obtain that lower probability for
the case that picked marble is not green equals to 1. We can express that by
the following formula of our language:
U=0.6(G ∪B) ∧ L=0.6(G ∪B)→ L=1¬G.
Another example of a lower and upper probabilistic formula is
U< 1
3
α→ L≥ 1
2
(α ∧ β),
where α, β ∈ ForC.
Next we state two formulas that are not well defined lower and upper
probabilistic formulas of the logic LUPP :
α ∧ U=1β, U≥sU≥rα.
The first formula is not well defined since it is a Boolean combination of a pure
propositional formula and an upper probabilistic formula, while the second
formula is not well defined lower and upper probabilistic formula because it
contains nested operators.
29
5.2. Semantics
The semantics for LUPP is based on the possible-world approach.
Definition 11 (LUPP -structure). An LUPP -structure is a tuple
〈W,H,P, υ〉, where:
• W is a nonempty set of worlds.
• H is an algebra of subsets of W . The elements of H are called mea-
surable worlds.
• P is a set of finitely additive probability measures defined on H
• υ : W × L −→ {true, false} provides for each world w ∈ W a two-
valued evaluation of the primitive propositions, which is extended to
classical propositional formulas as usual.
For given α ∈ ForC and LUPP -structure M , let [α]M = {w ∈ W |
υ(w)(α) = true}. We will not write the subscript M when it’s clear from
context.
Definition 12 (Measurable structure). The structure M = 〈W,H,P, υ〉
is measurable if [α]M ∈ H for every α ∈ ForC. The class of a measurable
structures of the logic LUPP will be denoted by LUPPMeas.
Next we define when a formula holds in a measurable structure. Since our
classical propositional formulas represent strict knowledge, we require them
to hold in every world of the structure.
Definition 13 (Satisfiability relation). The satisfiability relation
|=⊆ LUPPMeas×ForLUPP is defined in the way such that for M = 〈W,H,P, υ〉
we have:
• M |= α iff υ(w)(α) = true, for all w ∈ W ,
• M |= U≥sα iff P ?([α]) ≥ s,
• M |= L≥sα iff P?([α]) ≥ s,
• M |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that M |= φ,
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• M |= φ ∧ ψ iff M |= φ and M |= ψ,
where α ∈ ForC and φ, ψ ∈ ForP .
Now we introduce some basic notions related to the satisfiability relation.
Definition 14 (Satisfiability of a formula). A formula ρ ∈ ForLUPP is
satisfiable if there is an LUPPMeas-model M such that M |= ρ; ρ is valid if
for every LUPPMeas-model M , M |= ρ. A set of formulas T is satisfiable if
there is an LUPPMeas-model M such that M |= ρ for every ρ ∈ T .
Note that we can use an argument similar as the one we used in Example
10 to show that the logic LUPP is not compact.
5.3. Decidability
We have already mentioned that Halpern and Pucella (2002) have shown
decidability for the formulas which are Boolean combinations of the expres-
sions of the form
r1`(α1) + . . .+ rn`(αn) ≥ rn+1,
where ` is the upper probability operator and ri are integers, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
n + 1}. First of all, note that using only integers as coefficients has the
same expressive power as using all rational numbers. For example, if we
want to express 3
7
`(α) ≥ 1 by using only integers, we can reformulate the
formula as 3`(α) ≥ 7, etc. Also note that our formula U≥sα is satisfiable
iff the formula `(α) ≥ s is satisfiable in the logic of Halpern and Pucella
(2002). Similarly, L≥sα is satisfiable iff the formula −`(¬α) ≥ −(1 − s) is
satisfiable. Then decidability of our logic is a consequence of decidability
of the logic provided by Halpern and Pucella (2002). Moreover, since the
problem of deciding whether a formula of their language is satisfiable is NP-
complete (Halpern and Pucella, 2002, Theorem 5.2), and also for the classical
formulas problem is NP-complete, we have an upper bound of the decidability
problem for LUPP . The lower bound follows from the well known fact that
the complexity of the decision problem for classical propositional logic is
NP-complete. Thus, the satisfiability problem for LUPP -formulas is NP-
complete as well.
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6. The axiomatization AxLUPP
The axiomatic system for the logic LUPP is very similar to the axiomatic
system for the logic LUPFO. We will denote the system by AxLUPP .
Axiom schemes consists of the Axioms (4)− (9) from the logic LUPFO
and the following axiom:
(a) all instances of the classical propositional tautologies,
while Inference Rules consists of all the Inference Rules from the logic
LUPFO except Rule (2).
It is easy to see that classical propositional logic is sublogic of the LUPP .
Inference relation, consistent and maximally consistent set are defined in the
same way as for the logic LUPFO. Also, it is clear that the Deduction
theorem holds for the logic LUPP as well.
7. Soundness and Completeness
7.1. Soundness
Theorem 6 (Soundness). The axiomatic system AxLUPP is sound with
respect to the class of LUPPMeas-models.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for the logic LUPFO. 
7.2. Completeness
In order to prove the strong completeness theorem for the logic LUPP ,
we first need to adapt Lemma 2 Theorem 4, since we now deal with a proposi-
tional language. Their proofs are the same as the proofs when we considered
the logic LUPFO.
Using those results, we can define the canonical model.
Definition 15. If T ? is the maximally consistent set of formulas, then a
tuple MT ? = 〈W,H,P, υ〉 is defined as:
• W = {w | w |= CnC(T )} contains all classical propositional interpre-
tations that satisfy the set CnC(T ),
• H = {[α] | α ∈ ForC}, where [α] = {w ∈ W | w |= α},
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• P is any set of probability measures such that P ?([α]) = sup{s | U≥sα ∈
T ?},
• for every world w and every propositional letter p, υ(w, p) = true iff
w |= p.
We can prove that MT ? is well defined and that it belongs to LUPPMeas
analogously as it is done in Lemma 3.
Theorem 7 (Strong completeness). A set of formulas T is consistent iff
it is LUPPMeas − satisfiable.
There is no difference between the proof of this theorem and the proof for
the strong completeness theorem for a logic LUPFO except that we consider
now classical propositional formulas instead of classical first-order formulas.
8. The logics LUPP FR(n) and LUPFOFR(n)
In this section we introduce the two families of finitary logics, LUPP FR(n)
and LUPFOFR(n). These logics have the same language as the logics LUPP
and LUPFO respectively, only their semantics are changed. Let us discuss
first the logic LUPP FR(n) which is similar to LUPP . The main difference
is that the finitely additive measures map H to N = {0, 1
n
, . . . , n−1
n
, 1}, for a
fixed positive integer n. Therefore, we obtain countably many different logics,
one for each n. Considering the semantics, a model is the tuple 〈W,H,P, υ〉
defined as above but the set P consists of finitely additive measures with
restricted range N , i.e., for each µ ∈ P , µ : H −→ N . Hence, for every
X ∈ H, P ?(X) also belongs toN , becauseN is finite and therefore sup{µ(x) |
µ ∈ P} = max{µ(x) | µ ∈ P}. The class of all measurable LUPP FR(n)
models is defined analoguosly as for the logic LUPP and will be denoted by
LUPP
FR(n)
Meas .
We want to show that there are finitary axiomatizations of these logics
and to prove that they are sound and complete with respect to the considered
classes of models.
For s ∈ [0, 1), let s+ = min{r ∈ N | s < r}, and if s ∈ (0, 1], let
s− = max{r ∈ N | s > r}.
The axiomatization of the logic LUPP FR(n) includes all the axioms from
Section 3, plus one more axiom:
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(8) U>sα → U≥s+α. The inference rules of the axiomatization are rules
(1) and (2) from Section 3. Consequently, our axiomatization is finite, and
the proofs are finite sequences of formulas.
Lemma 4. (a) ` U>sα↔ U≥s+α,
(b) ` U<sα↔ U≤s−α,
(c) ` ∨s∈N U=sα,
(d) ` ∨
s∈NU=sα.
8
Proof. Proofs for (a) and (b) are trivial (direct consequences of Axiom 8
including contrapositive).
(c) Clearly ` (U≥1α ∨ ¬U≥1α) ∧ ¬U>1α. Therefore
` (U≥1α ∧ ¬U>1α) ∨ (¬U≥1α ∧ ¬U>1α).
Since U≥1α ∧ ¬U>1α = U=1α and ` U<1α → U≤1α we have ` U=1α ∨ U<1α.
Furthermore, using a tautology A↔ ((B ∨ ¬B) ∧ A), we obtain
` U<1α↔ ((U≥1−α ∨ ¬U≥1−α) ∧ U<1α).
From that, using the classical propositional tautology (A ∨ B) ∧ C ↔ (A ∧
C)∨ (B ∧C) and the following equivalence U<1α↔ ¬U>1−α, we obtain that
` U<1α↔ ((U≥1−α ∧ ¬U>1−α) ∨ (U<1−α ∧ U<1α)).
Since ` U=1α∨U<1α, using the equivalence above, and the facts that U=1−α↔
(U≥1−α ∧ ¬U>1−α) and U<1−α↔ (U<1−α ∧ U<1α) we obtain that
` U=1α ∨ U=1−α ∨ U<1−α.
Finally, we have that ` (∨s∈N U=sα) ∨ U<0α, so ` (∨s∈N U=sα).
(d) U=rα = U≥rα ∧ ¬U>rα, so ` U=rα→ ¬U=sα, for every s > r. Similarly,
we can prove that ` U=rα→ ¬U=sα, for every s < r. So, using result proved
in (c), as a consequence we obtain ` ∨
s∈NU=sα. 
The proof of the strong completeness theorem is similar to one presented
in Section 4. We will only explain the idea of the proof without going into
the details. First, we can prove the soundness theorem:
8
∨
stands for the exclusive disjunction, i.e., for the logic operation which is true if and
only if exactly one value is true
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Theorem 8 (Soundness). The axiomatic system AxLUPPFR(n) is sound with
respect to the class of LUPP
FR(n)
Meas -models.
Next, we prove the deduction theorem:
Theorem 9 (Deduction theorem). Let T be a set of formulas. Then T ∪
{ρ} ` σ iff T ` ρ→ σ.
The proof is straightforward. After that, we prove:
Theorem 10. Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a maximal
consistent set.
The proof of Theorem 10 is similar to the proof of the Theorem 4. The
only difference is that we skip the steps where we use infinitary inference
rules, i.e. steps 2(b) and 2(c). One more fact needs some explanation. In
the proof of the strong completeness theorem for the logic LUPFO we use
that if sup{r | U≥rα ∈ T ?} = s, and s ∈ S, then U≥sα ∈ T ?. Now, we
have that s must belong to the set N . Indeed, if s /∈ N then there is
some r < s such that r+ = s+ (i.e. r > s−, density of rational numbers),
so, U≥r+α ∈ T ?, i.e. U≥s+α ∈ T ?, therefore T ? ` U≥s+α, but s < s+.
Contradiction. Furthermore, U≥sα ∈ T ? because of Lemma 4(d). The rest
of the proof of the strong completeness is identical as in Section 7. Thus, the
following statement holds for the logic LUPP .
Theorem 11 (Strong completeness). A set of formulas T is consistent
iff it is LUPP
FR(n)
Meas − satisfiable.
The logic LUPFOFR(n) can be obtained from LUPFO in the same way
as the logic LUPP FR(n) is obtained from LUPP . Because of the obvious
similarities in the construction and the proofs, we omit details.
Also, note that, because of the simplified semantics, the logics LUPP FR(n)
and LUPFOFR(n) are compact.
9. Related work
Arguably, the most important advancement in probability logic, after the
work of Leibnitz and Boole, was made by Keisler (1977, 1985), who gave
model-theoretic approach to probability theory. Keisler introduced several
probability quantifiers appropriate for statistical reasoning, as for example
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Px > r. The considered models are first-order structures with probabilities
on their domains. The formula (Px > r)φ(x) means that the set {a | φ(a)}
has probability greater than r. A recursive axiomatization for that kind
of logics was given by Hoover (1978). He used admissible and countable
fragments of infinitary predicate logic. Later, Bacchus (1990) considered a
similar logic, with the constraint that the range of probability functions is
required to be the unit interval of a totally ordered field, instead of a partic-
ular field, (e.g., [0, 1], or [0, 1]Q). That modification allowed him to obtain a
finitary, strongly complete axiomatization, using the standard Henkin style
procedure. As it is pointed out by Ognjanovic et al. (2016), there are sen-
tences on the real-valued probability functions that are not provable in that
system.
Since the middle of 1980s, researchers attempt to combine probability-
based and logic-based approaches to knowledge representation, developing
the logical frameworks for modelling uncertainty in which probabilities ex-
press degrees of belief. In the first of those papers which resulted from the
work on developing an expert system in medicine, Nilsson (1986) presented a
logic with probabilistic operators as a well-founded framework for uncertain
reasoning. He gave a procedure for probabilistic entailment that calculates
bounds on the probabilities of a conclusion, given probabilities of premises.
The first probability logic developed along the lines of the Nilsson’s research
is due to Fagin et al. (1990). They have developed a propositional logic for
reasoning about simple and conditional probabilities. Reasoning about prob-
abilities is formally expressed by linear weight formulas, which are Boolean
combinations of the basic formulas. An example of the basic linear weight
formula is 1
2
w(α) + 2
5
w(α ∧ β) > 5
6
, where α and β are formulas in some un-
derlying classical propositional logic and w(α) reads “the probability of α”.
They provided a finitary axiomatization for the logic, and they proved weak
completeness. The standard semantics for this kind of probability logics (Fa-
gin et al. (1990); Fagin and Halpern (1994); Halpern and Pucella (2006)) is
a variant of Kripke models, where accessibility relation between the worlds
is replaced by a finitely additive probability measure, and it is also used in
the fuzzy approach to probabilistic reasoning (Ha´jek et al. (1995); Flaminio
and Godo (2007)).
This Kripke-style semantics is also proposed for probability logics with
unary operators by Ognjanovic and Raskovic (1999, 2000). They developed
a new technique for proving strong completeness for non-compact probabil-
ity logics which combines Henkin-style procedures for classical and modal
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logics and which works with infinitary proofs. That technique allowed them
to prove strong completeness for real-valued probabilities. For a detailed
overview of the approach we refer the reader to Ognjanovic et al. (2016).
In this work, we followed the approach and we modified the technique they
developed.
Jaeger (2005) developed a first-order logic for inductive probabilistic rea-
soning Lip. He obtained weakly complete axiomatization, but he paid the
price by allowing probability distributions in the semantic models that use
non-standard probability values. Halpern (1990) considered two first-order
probability logics. In the first logic probabilities are defined on the domain,
while in the second logic probabilities are defined on possible worlds, but
with the restriction that the measures µ(w) in all worlds of a model are
equal. Thus, formulas expressing probabilities either hold in every world
from a model or they are not satisfiable in that model. Halpern provided
axiomatizations for both logics, but completeness can be proved only if the
domains are bounded in size by some finite n. Bacchus (1990) argued that
it is difficult to justify that assumption even for artificial intelligence appli-
cations. In his opinion, while domain may be finite, it is questionable that
there is a fixed upper bound on its size. Bacchus also pointed out that there
are many domains, interesting in AI applications, that are not finite. Later,
Ognjanovic and Raskovic (2000) introduced a strongly complete axiom sys-
tem for the first-order probability logic with probabilities defined on possible
worlds with unbounded domains.
Poole (2003) and Grove et al. (1992) also worked on probabilistic first-
order probabilistic logics, but we point out that axiomatization issues are not
consiedered in those papers. Grove et al. (1992) considered how to compute
the asymptotic conditional probabilities for the first-order formulas, i.e. for
two first-order formulas ϕ and ψ, they considered the number of structures
with a finite domain that satisfy ψ, and computed the fraction of them in
which ϕ is true. Poole (2003) worked on first-order probabilistic inference,
investigating first-order belief networks and providing an algorithm for rea-
soning about multiple individuals, where some facts about some of them are
known, but the rest is treated as a group.
In all the logics reviewed above, each semantical model is equipped with
a unique probability measure (defined on the domain of a first-order struc-
ture for the logics with the statistical approach, or on sets of worlds for the
subjective probability approaches). Consequently, a sentence of the form
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(*) “probability of α is at least s”
has a fixed truth value (true or false) in each model, depending on the mea-
sure of the semantical set that corresponds to α.
In this paper, we consider the situations in which uncertainty is repre-
sented by a set of probability measures. In the cases where are different
measures in a single semantical model M , we cannot always assign a truth
value to the sentence (∗). Indeed, consider sentence (∃x)Head Crash(x) from
Example 9 and denote the sentence by β. The model M from Example 9
contains the measures µ1 and µ2 such that µ1([β]) = 0.8 and µ2([β]) = 0.6.
In that case, we cannot assign the value true or false to the sentence
(**) “probability of β is at least 0.7”
in the model M . Obviously, the syntax with classical probability operators
from the papers discussed above is not appropriate for the models with mul-
tiple measures. On the other hand, we can state some simple probability
boundaries in our semantical frameworks, which speak that the probability
of a formula being true is at least s for all/some probability measure from a
model, i.e.,
“upper/lower probability of α is at least s.”
If we consider Example 9 again, instead of statement (∗∗), we can consider
the sentences
“upper (lower) probability of β is at least 0.7,”
which has the value true (false, respectively) in the model M (see Example
9).
The only logic for reasoning about upper probability measures is intro-
duced by Halpern and Pucella (2002). Following the technique by Fagin
et al. (1990), they developed a propositional logic which allows reasoning
about linear inequalities involving upper probabilities, and they proved weak
completeness. On the other hand, we followed the technique of Ognjanovic
and Raskovic (1999, 2000), and we proved strong completeness using infini-
tary rules of inference. We introduced the syntax with unary operators for
lower and upper probabilities, which is a simpler syntax than the syntax from
Halpern and Pucella (2002), since we don’t have the arithmetical operations
built into formulas. Finally, while Halpern and Pucella (2002) introduced the
propositional logic only, we also developed a first-order logic for reasoning
about lower and upper probabilities.
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10. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the logics LUPP and LUPFO, whose lan-
guages are obtained by adding the operators for upper and lower probabilities
to propositional and first-order logic, respectively. We proposed the axioma-
tizations for the logics and proved strong completeness. Since the logics are
not compact, the axiomatizations contain infinitary rules of inference. Then
we simplified the semantics and we achieved compactness using finite sets of
probability values for logics LUPP FR(n) and LUPFOFR(n). For those logics
we provide finitary axiomatizations.
The logics presented in this work extend several existing results. First,
LUPP is similar in spirit to the logic by Halpern and Pucella (2002) (the
former provides strongly complete axiomatization, while the latter provides a
finitary axiomatization which is weakly complete and incorporate arithmeti-
cal operations into syntax). LUPFO can be seen as the first-order extension
of those logics. The logics LPP2 and LFOP2 by Ognjanovic and Raskovic
(2000) can be seen as special cases of the logics LUPP and LUPFO, respec-
tively, if the set of probability measures is a singleton (thus we are reduced
to standard probabilistic logics). Syntactically, that restriction corresponds
to an additional axiom: U≥rα→ L≥rα. Similarly, the logic by van der Hoek
(1997) can be seen as special case of LUPP FR(n).
Finally, we recall that our logics do not allow mixing of probabilistic and
non-probabilistic knowledge in a single formula or higher-order lower/upper
probabilities. In the future work, we plan to extend the approach from this
paper in the way that we allow both types of formulas. We believe that a more
modal approach, in which every world is equipped with a set of probability
measures, is the obvious choice for the semantics of such logic.
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